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THE THEOCRATIC CHALLENGE TO CONSTITUTION
DRAFTING IN POST-CONFLICT STATES
RAN HIRSCHL*
INTRODUCTION
Over the past few decades, principles of theocratic governance
have gained enormous public support in developing polities
worldwide. The countries experiencing this resurgence of religious
fundamentalism are diverse, spanning the globe from central and
southeast Asia to north and sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle
East. The Khomeini-led revolution in Iran is perhaps the quintes-
sential manifestation of this broad trend,' but newspaper headlines
report almost weekly on religious fundamentalist insurgency in
countries as diverse as Morocco, Pakistan, and Indonesia. Moreover,
a process of "Islamization" of laws has taken place in dozens of sub-
national jurisdictions: twelve northern Nigerian states led by
Zamfara state;2 Zanzibar, an island formally part of Tanzania
that enjoys wide legislative autonomy;3 the states Kelantan and
Terengganu in Malaysia, where the Parti Islam Semalaysia formed
a government in the 1990s; 4 and Pakistan's Northwest Frontier
Province, where the Muttahida Majilis-i-Amal party has ruled since
2003.' Religious parties have gained a tremendous popular following
in countries as diverse as Egypt,' India,7 Bangladesh,8 Nigeria,9
* Professor of Political Science & Law; Canada Research Chair in Constitutionalism,
Democracy, and Development, University of Toronto; Jeremiah Smith, Jr. Visiting Professor
of Law, Harvard Law School.
1. See 2 ENCYCLOPEDIAOFPOLITICSANDRELIGION 755 (Robert Wuthnow ed., 2d ed. 2007)
[hereinafter 2 POLITICS AND RELIGION].
2. Id. at 662.
3. See Marc Lacey, Tourists and Islam Mingle, Not Always Cozily, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6,
2002, at A4.
4. See 2 POLITICS AND RELIGION, supra note 1, at 582.
5. Id. at 689.
6. See 1 ENCYCLOPEDIAOFPOLITIcSANDRELIGION 266 (Robert Wuthnow ed., 2ded. 2007)
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Algeria, ° and Turkey. The sweeping win of the pro-Islamic AK
Party in Turkey's July 2007 general election further illustrates
this trend. 2 Meanwhile, religion continues to play a key role in
European politics, from Catholic Ireland" and Poland 14 to Orthodox
Serbia.' 5 Evangelical Pentecostalism has become prevalent in Latin
America."6 A similar trend can be seen in North America, where
religious fundamentalism, primarily the Christian Right, has
become a significant political force. 17
The theocratic wave is a major source of friction in today's world.
Iraq and Afghanistan are two obvious examples, but there are, alas,
many others. The mass atrocities in Darfur are linked to Islamic
fundamentalists coming to power in Sudan in the late 1980s. 8 In
northern Africa, a vicious decade-long war between the French-
backed government of Algeria and the Islamic Salvation Front
erupted after Islamists won the first multiparty election in that
country in the early 1990s. " In the Horn of Africa, Somalia, Eritrea,
and Ethiopia are entangled in a bloody religion-related cycle of
sectarian violence.2" Hezbollah (the "party of God") now threatens
to overthrow the state's fragile multiparty coalition in Lebanon.2'
The struggle between the nationalist Fatah movement and the
religious Hamas movement has effectively split the Palestinian
[hereinafter 1 POLITICS AND RELIGION].
7. See id. at 414.
8. See Saad Eddin Ibrahim, Editorial, Islam Can Vote, If We Let It, N.Y. TIMES, May 21,
2005, at A13.
9. See 2 PoLITICs AND RELIGION, supra note 1, at 662-63.
10. See 1 POLITICS AND RELIGION, supra note 6, at 24.
11. See 2 POLITICS AND RELIGION, supra note 1, at 896.
12. See Sabrina Tavernise, Governing Party Scores Big Victory in Turkish Vote, N.Y.
TIMES, July 23, 2007, at A3.
13. 1 POLITICS AND RELIGION, supra note 6, at 434-36.
14. 2 POLITICS AND RELIGION, supra note 1, at 720-22.
15. See id. at 958-59.
16. See Paul Freston, Contours of Latin American Pentecostalism, in CHRISTIANITY
REBORN: THE GLOBAL EXPANSION OF EVANGELICALISM IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 227-32
(Donald M. Lewis ed., 2004).
17. 2 POLITICS AND RELIGION, supra note 1, at 908.
18. See id. at 856-57.
19. See 1 POLITICS AND RELIGION, supra note 6, at 24.
20. See 2 POLITICS AND RELIGION, supra note 1, at 839.
21. Id. at 551-52.
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people.22 Moreover, this theocratic surge has other indirect effects
on conflict areas: because political stability in Morocco and
Algeria has become a primary interest of the West in the post-9/1 1
reality, international efforts to resolve the conflict over Western
Sahara-approximately two-thirds of which is controlled by Morocco
and the other third, also known as the Sahrawi Arab Democratic
Republic, is actively supported by Algeria-have sunk into
oblivion.23 In short, it is hard to overstate the significance of the
fundamentalist turn in late twentieth and early twenty-first century
politics.
In this Article, I explore several key aspects of constitutionalism
in a theocratic world. I begin by identifying the challenges posed by
the theocratic surge to canonical power-sharing, consociational
models for mitigating tensions in multi-ethnic polities. Second, I
define the concept of "constitutional theocracy" and its emergence
as a new form of governance over the last few decades. In the
Article's third Part, I survey five constitutional responses to the
problem of "religion and state" and examine a few innovative legal
developments employed by countries in the Islamic world to hedge
the challenge of constitutional theocracy. In the fourth Part, I
explore the secularizing role of constitutional courts and jurispru-
dence in predominantly religious polities. Examples are drawn from
Egypt, Pakistan, Turkey, Israel, Nigeria, Malaysia, and other
polities facing deep social and political tensions along the secu-
lar/religious divide.
I. THE THEOCRATIC CHALLENGE TO CONVENTIONAL
POWER-SHARING MECHANISMS
The literature on constitutional design and engineering is
voluminous. Its canonical tenor suggests that when consti-
tutionalization is seen as a pragmatic "second order" measure-as
opposed to instances of constitutionalization involving a more
principled, first order "we the people" outlook-it may help institu-
tionalize attempts to mitigate tensions in ethnically divided polities
through the adoption of federalism, secured representation, and
22. See id. at 692-93.
23. See, e.g., ERIKJENSEN, WESTERN SAHARA: ANATOMY OFA STALEMATE 30, 115-21 (2004).
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other trust-building and power-sharing mechanisms.24 Surprisingly,
however, although there are many examples of discussions of the
mitigating potential of constitutional power-sharing mechanisms to
ease rifts along national, ethnic, or linguistic lines, scholars of
comparative constitutional design have given little attention to the
increasing divisions along secular/religious lines. From an analytical
standpoint, the secular/religious divide differs in at least four
respects from these more obvious and commonly addressed markers
of identity.
First, more than any other divisions along ascriptive or imagined
lines, the secular/religious divide cuts across nations otherwise
unified by their members' joint ethnic, religious, linguistic, and
historical origins. In this sense, the secularism/religiosity factor, or
other closely associated distinctions such as universalism versus
parochialism, is closer in nature to less visible categories such as
income deciles, social class, or cultural milieu than it is to other
kinds of markers such as race, gender, or ethnicity. Nationalist
Catalans, Flemish, or Quebecers see themselves as autonomous
people with a unique cultural heritage, language, and history
that is distinct from that of Spaniards, Valons, or Anglophone
Canadians, respectively.25 By contrast, most cosmopolitan and
traditionalist Egyptians define themselves as members of the same
nation, speak the same language or dialects of it, treasure the
Pharaoh dynasty, and share the same ancestral ties.26 Importantly,
however, some Egyptians are close adherents of religious directives,
while others follow them more casually.27
Second, the territorial boundaries of the secular/religious divide
are often blurred. Although residents of certain regions within a
given country may be more prone to holding theocratic views than
24. The works that propose various versions of this "consociational" approach are too
numerous to cite. Two prominent exponents of this line of thought are Donald Horowitz and
Arend Lijphart. See generally DONALD HOROwiTz, ETHNIC GROUPS IN CONFLICT (2000); AREND
LIJPHART, DEMOCRACY IN PLURAL SOCIETIES: A COMPARATIVE EXPLORATION (1977).
25. Dominique Arel, Political Stability in Multinational Democracies: Comparing
Language Dynamics in Brussels, Montreal and Barcelona, in MULTINATIONAL DEMOCRACIES
65, 68-89 (Alain-G. Gagnon & James Tully eds., 2001).
26. See NILOOFAR HAERi, SACRED LANGUAGE, ORDINARY PEOPLE: DILEMMAS OF CULTURE
AND POLITICS IN EGYPT 136 (2003).
27. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, ANNUAL REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
2001, at 421-29 (2001), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/9001.pdf.
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residents of other regions, this divide is not neatly demarcated along
territorial lines, as is often the case with ethnic or linguistic
boundaries. Proponents of theocratic governance may reside in
peripheral towns, or in blue collar neighborhoods at the outskirts of
large urban centers. But they may also reside within a few bus stops
from bastions of modernism such as art galleries, universities,
shopping malls, or government buildings. This is in stark contrast
to, say, Sri Lanka, where the vast majority of Tamils live in one
region of the island;28 or, better yet, Cyprus, where the territorial
divide between the Greeks and the Turks is clearly demarcated.29
Territory-based power-sharing mechanisms--or any other kind of
joint governance structures that are based on the allocation of
powers or goods by a regional key-may not be an efficient means
for analyzing, let alone reducing, tensions along secular/religious
lines.
Third, the assumption that whole peoples share unified interests
is questionable at best. Akin to early writings about the post-
colonial world that tended to view post-colonial countries as a
homogeneous block, populist academic and media accounts in the
West tend to portray the spread of religious fundamentalism in the
developing world as a near-monolithic, ever-accelerating, and all-
encompassing phenomenon."° In contrast to the Western portrayal
of religion as private and relatively benign, "politicized" religions
are depicted as being a threat to reason and a hindrance to
progress.3 The Islamic world in particular has been the target of
much of this critique, described by leading public intellectuals as a
monolithic entity committed to a fundamentalist, anti-Western
agenda. 2 The post-9/11 popular media followed suit by portraying
28. 1 POLITICS AND RELIGION, supra note 6, at 274-75.
29. See U.S. Dep't of State, Background Note: Cyprus (Jan. 2008), http://www.state.gov/r/
pa/ei/bgn/5376.htm.
30. For an oft-cited illustration, see generally SAMUEL HUNTINGTON, THE CLASH OF
CIVILIZATIONS AND THE REMAKING OF WORLD ORDER (1998).
31. See, e.g., TALALASAD, GENEALOGIES OF RELIGION: DISCIPLINE AND REASONS OF POWER
IN CHRISTIANITY AND ISLAM 27-29 (1993).
32. See, e.g., HUNTINGTON, supra note 30, at 109-19; BERNARD LEWIS, WHAT WENT
WRONG? THE CLASH BETWEEN ISLAM AND MODERNITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST 156-60 (2003). For
an alternative, more nuanced approach, see NOAH FELDMAN, AFTER JIHAD: AMERICA AND THE
STRUGGLE FOR ISLAMIC DEMOCRACY 228-31 (2003); CARRIE ROSEFsKY-WICKHAM, MOBILIZING
ISLAM: RELIGION, ACTIVISM, AND POLITICAL CHANGE IN EGYPT 1-2 (2002).
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Islamic societies as united by their religious zeal and antiliberal
sentiment. In practice, however, the picture in most predominantly
religious polities-Islamic, Jewish, Roman Catholic, or Hinduist-is
much more complex and nuanced, reflecting deep divisions and
strife along secular/religious lines, as well as widely divergent
beliefs, interpretations, and degrees of practice within religious
communities.
In fact, most countries that have experienced a revival of religious
fundamentalism over the past few decades have long been caught
between identities, worldviews, and commitments that are at once
secular and religious, universalist and particularist. In virtually all
of these countries, the very nature of the sociopolitical order has
been highly contested; civic ideology, an often relatively cosmopoli-
tan lifestyle, and diverse policy preferences are all often striving to
establish or maintain their hegemony vis-A-vis embedded symbols
of tradition, religiosity, and exceptionalism. 33
Principles of theocratic governance may pose a threat to the
cultural and policy preferences of secular-nationalist elites in these
countries. After all, theocratic governance has seldom appealed to
members of the often cosmopolitan urban intelligentsia and the
managerial class and state bureaucrats may see it as an impedi-
ment to progress and modernization.3 ' Theocratic governance is also
often at odds with principles of modern economy and may threaten
the interests of major economic sectors and stakeholders. 5 And it
would be an understatement to say that theocratic governments are
not the type of regimes that find favor with supranational trade and
monetary bodies such as the International Monetary Fund, the
World Bank, or the World Trade Organization. Additionally, with
few exceptions, theocracy has been, and remains, abhorred by the
military-perceived as a symbol of secular nationalism in many
developing polities.
Fourth, and perhaps most importantly, is the uneasy union of
constitutionalism and theocratic governance. Unlike the cases of
33. See 1 POLITICS AND RELIGION, supra note 6, at 319-21 (describing the clash between
modernization and fundamentalism generally).
34. See Leslie C. Griffin, Fundamentalism from the Perspective of Liberal Tolerance, 24
CARDOZO L. REv. 1631, 1633-35 (2003) (contrasting the anti-modernization views of religious
fundamentalists with those of a typical Rawlsian liberal democrat).
35. See 2 POLITICS AND RELIGION, supra note 1, at 879.
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race, gender, ethnicity, or language, there seems to be an embedded
tension between fundamentals of theocratic governance and
principles of modern constitutionalism. Principles of theocratic
governance often stem from and adhere to alternative sources of
authority and legitimacy. The rule of God, not the rule of law, is the
ultimate tenet here.36 In other words, the holistic nature of theocra-
tic governance is not prima facie conducive to constitutional
compromise, power-sharing pacts, separation of powers, checks and
balances, relative judicial independence, and other essentials of
modern constitutionalism. What is more, principles of divine
authority and theocratic governance are often at odds with interna-
tional human rights regimes and principles, perhaps most tellingly
in the contexts of religious freedoms, gender equality, or reproduc-
tive liberty.37
These conflicting pressures and interests have led to intense
constitutional maneuvering in predominantly religious polities.
All of these countries face the sources of friction inherent in a
constitutional theocracy-a potentially explosive combination by its
very nature, and one that poses new challenges to conventional
constitutional ideas about secularism, religious freedom, and the
relationship between religion and the state. How can a polity
therefore reconcile the principles of accountability, separation of
powers, and the notion of "we the people" as the ultimate source of
sovereignty when the fundamental notion of divine authority and
holy texts make up the supreme governing norm of the state? Who
should be vested with the ultimate authority to interpret the divine
text, and on what grounds? What ought to be done when principles
of modern constitutionalism and human rights collide with religious
injunctions and support for theocratic governance? And, more
generally, how can a polity advance principles of twenty-first
century government or run a modern economy when it treats
ancient texts and pious authorities as a main source of legislation?
36. See id. at 877.
37. See id. at 879 (describing the typical friction between religious fundamentalist regimes
and international human rights principles). For a discussion of the incompatibility of
fundamentalist religious belief and women's rights, see Clara Connolly & Pragna Patel,
Women Who Walk on Water: Working Across "Race" in Women Against Fundamentalism, in
THE POLITICS OF CULTURE IN THE SHADOW OF CAPITAL 375 (Lisa Lowe & David Lloyd eds.,
1997).
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
In short, the theocratic challenge is inherently more difficult to
overcome through constitution drafting than, say, divisions along
ethnic or linguistic lines. This undermines the applicability of
traditional power-sharing, "consociational" constitutional models
commonly proposed as a way of mitigating tensions in troubled
multi-ethnic polities.3 8 Conflict settings where internal strife is high
and state capacity is low merely exacerbate these difficulties.
An unfortunate "textbook" example of such difficulties is the
Palestinian National Authority, where the struggle between the
nationalist Fatah movement and the religious Hamas-led govern-
ment has brought the polity to the brink of civil war. 9 These
tensions were reflected in both the 1997 Basic Law4° and the 2003
Draft Constitution41 that was included as part of the "Roadmap to
Peace,"42 proposed by the United States, the United Nations, Russia,
and the European Union. In the latter document, often referred to
as the 'Third Draft of the Constitution of the State of Palestine,"
Islam was adopted as the official state religion, though it also
explicitly stated that Christian or other "monotheistic religions"
would be accorded full respect and acknowledgment.43 Specifically,
Article 7 adopted "[t]he principles of Islamic Shari'a" as "a major
source for legislation,"44 avoiding a more forceful conceptualization
38. For a description of the consociational model, as well as problems associated with this
model, see Donald L. Horowitz, Conciliatory Institutions and Constitutional Processes in Post-
Conflict States, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1213 (2008).
39. For an extensive analysis of pertinent secular/religious tensions in Palestine, see
generally LOREN D. LYBARGER, IDENTITY AND RELIGION IN PALESTINE: THE STRUGGLE
BETWEEN ISLAMISM AND SECULARISM IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES (2007).
40. Palestine Basic Law (May. 29, 2002), available at http://www.mideastweb.org/
basiclaw.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2008).
41. CONST. OF THE STATE OF PALESTINE [Third Draft] (2003], available at
http://www.jmcc.orgtdocuments/palestineconstitution-eng.pdf.
42. See Press Statement, Office of the Spokesman, U.S. Dep't of State, A Performance-
Based Roadmap to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (Apr.
30, 2003), available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2003/20062.htm.
43. CONST. OF THE STATE OF PALESTINE [Third Draft] art. 5 [2003], available at http://
www.jmcc.orgdocuments/palestineconstitution-eng.pdf. See generally Nathan Brown,
Constituting Palestine: The Effort To Write a Basic Law for the Palestinian Authority, 54
MIDDLE E. J. 25 (2000); NATHAN BROWN, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INVL PEACE, PAPER NO.
59, EVALUATING PALESTINIAN REFORM (June 2005), available at http://www.carnegie
endowment.orglfileslCP59.brown.FINAL.pdf.
44. CONST. OF THE STATE OF PALESTINE [Third Draft] art. 7 [2003], available at http://
www.jmcc.orgtdocuments/palestineconstitution-eng.pdf.
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of the role of Islamic law in Palestinian society. Then came the
surprise landslide victory by Hamas in the January 2006 parliamen-
tary elections.45 Shortly thereafter, the Palestinian Legislative
Council (PLC) approved the establishment of a constitutional
court-a move undertaken by Fatah in its last days as a majority in
the PLC in an attempt to constrain Hamas when it took over
Parliament.46 A new nine-judge court was to be convened with
judges appointed by President Mahmoud Abbas of the Fatah, which
would have the power to rule illegal those laws judged to violate the
Basic Law.47 Theoretically at least, Abbas effectively would have
been in a position to veto laws passed by Hamas legislators. In its
first legislative move in Parliament, however, Hamas-led by the
then newly elected, but now ousted Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh,
and by Hamas leader-in-exile Khaled Mash'al-voted to invalidate
all legislation passed by the outgoing Fatah following the 2006
election, including the creation of the constitutional court.4"
An unstable coalition government was established in March
2006, 49 but tensions continued, at times violently. In early 2007, the
strain between Hamas and Fatah escalated into a violent struggle,
claiming the lives of over ninety Palestinians in Gaza and the West
Bank.5" A truce was then reached in the holy city of Mecca in
February 2007.51 According to the agreement on the distribution of
cabinet positions, nine posts were to go to Hamas,52 including the
more "ideologically sensitive" portfolios of education, justice, and the
45. Hamas took 74 out of the 132 seats in the Palestinian Legislative Council, while Fatah
won only 45; independent candidates won the remaining seats. See Greg Myre, Despite Victory
by Hamnas, Control of Palestinian Security Forces Remains Uncertain, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30,
2006, at A6.
46. Steven Erlanger, U.S. and Israelis Are Said To Talk of Hamas Ouster, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 13, 2006, at Al.
47. Id.
48. Greg Myre, Hamas Legislators Strip Palestinian President of Wider Powers, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 6, 2006, at A7.
49. See Laura King, Hamas Undoes New Powers Given to Palestinian President; Fatah
Lawmakers Walk Out of Parliament in Protest, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2006, at A3.
50. Greg Myre, Fighting Eases on First Day of a Cease-Fire by Gaza Factions, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 31, 2007, at A3.
51. Hassan M. Fattah, Accord Is Signed by Palestinians To Stop Feuding, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 9, 2007, at Al.
52. Joel Greenberg, Fatah and Hamas OK Power-Sharing Deal; Mecca Agreement Aims
To End Sanctions and Factional Fighting, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 9, 2007, at Cll.
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Wakf portfolio overseeing collectively-owned land and real estate
held in trust for Muslim religious or charitable purposes. 53 Six
"practical" ministries were given to Fatah, including agriculture,
transportation, health, and public works.54 Three key ministries
-foreign affairs, finance, and interior, which controls security-
would be held by independents.55
This agreement was derailed, however, when a violent Hamas-led
takeover of the Gaza Strip took place in June 2007.56 President
Mahmoud Abbas reacted by dismissing the coalition Hamas-Fatah
government and by appointing a moderate Fatah politician to head
the new Palestinian Authority government." As this example
illustrates, there is not a dull constitutional moment west of the
Jordan River, or indeed wherever a deep rift between secular-
nationalist worldviews and religious-fundamentalist aspirations
cuts across a demos not otherwise divided along ethnic, territorial,
or linguistic lines.
II. THE EMERGENCE OF CONSTITUTIONAL THEOCRACY
The limited relevance of traditional power-sharing, consociational
models for addressing the secular/religious divide suggests that we
ought to look elsewhere for explanatory guidance. At the uneasy
intersection of two present-day trends-the tremendous increase of
popular support for principles of theocratic governance and the
global spread of constitutionalism-a new legal order has emerged:
constitutional theocracy. In contrast to a "pure" theocracy, power in
constitutional theocracies resides in lay political figures operating
within the bounds of a constitution, rather than from within the
religious leadership itself. Basic principles such as the separation
of powers are constitutionally enshrined.58 The constitution also
53. Zeina Ashrawi, The Palestinian National Unity Government (Palestine Ctr. Info. Brief
No. 149, Mar. 14, 2007), available at http://www.thejerusalemfund.org/images/information
brief.php?ID=175.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Steven Erlanger, Hamas Seizes Broad Control in Gaza Strip, N.Y. TIMES, June 14,
2007, at Al.
57. Harvey Morris, Abbas Bypasses Hamas in New Palestinian Government, FIN. TIMES
(London), June 18, 2007, at 6.
58. See, e.g., Ran Hirschl, Constitutional Courts vs. Religious Fundamentalism: Three
[Vol. 49:11791188
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typically establishes a constitutional court that is mandated to carry
out some form of active judicial review.59
At the same time, constitutional theocracies defy the Franco-
American doctrine of strict structural and substantive separation of
religion and state. Akin to models of "establishment" or "state
religion," constitutional theocracies both formally endorse and
actively support a single religion or faith denomination. ° Moreover,
that state religion is enshrined as the principal source that informs
all legislation and methods of judicial interpretation. Unlike the
handful of European countries with a state church, the designated
state religion in constitutional theocracies is often viewed as
constituting the foundation of the modern state; as such, it is an
integral part, or even the metaphorical pillar, of the polity's national
meta-narrative. In this way, religion often determines the polity's
boundaries of collective identity as well as the scope and nature of
some or all of the rights and duties assigned to its residents.
Constitutional theocracies, however, do more than simply grant
exclusive recognition and support to a given state religion: Laws
must conform to principles of religious doctrine and no statute may
be enacted that is repugnant to these principles. In most instances,
a well-developed nexus of religious bodies, tribunals, and authorities
operates in lieu of, or in tandem with, a civil court system. The
opinions and jurisprudence of these authorities and tribunals carry
notable symbolic weight and play a significant role in public life.
Importantly, however, the entirety of this nexus of laws and
institutions is subject to judicial review by a constitutional court or
tribunal. This tribunal consists of judges who are often well-versed
in both general and religious law, and can speak knowledgeably on
pertinent matters of law to jurists at Yale Law School as well as at
the al-Azhar center of Islamic learning in Cairo."'
Middle Eastern Tales, 82 TEx. L. REV. 1819, 1822 (2004) (describing separation of the
Egyptian Supreme Constitutional Court (SCC) from other branches of government).
59. See id. (describing the Egyptian example and noting that the SCC has "broad judicial
authority to review the constitutionality of laws and regulations, settle jurisdictional conflicts
between courts, and reconcile conflicting judgments issued by lower courts").
60. See id. at 1823 (describing the Egyptian example and examining Article 2 of the
Egyptian Constitution, which reads, '"Islam is the religion of the state....' The result of this
amendment effectively transferred Egypt into a 'constitutional theocracy."').
61. The al-Azhar Center is an institution representing the Egyptian religious
establishment and widely recognized throughout the Islamic world as a major theological
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The "ideal" model of a constitutional theocracy can be summa-
rized by outlining four main elements: (1) adherence to some or all
core elements of modern constitutionalism, including the formal
distinction between political authority and religious authority, and
the existence of some form of active judicial review; (2) the presence
of a single religion or religious denomination that is formally
endorsed by the state as the "state religion"; (3) the constitutional
enshrining of the religion, its texts, directives, and interpretations
as a or the main source of legislation and judicial interpretation of
laws--essentially, laws may not infringe upon injunctions of the
state-endorsed religion; and (4) a nexus of religious bodies and
tribunals that not only carry symbolic weight, but that are also
granted official jurisdictional status and operate in lieu of, or in an
uneasy tandem with, a civil court system. All in all, hundreds of
millions of people, perhaps as many as a billion people, now live in
polities that either fall squarely within the definition of a constitu-
tional theocracy or that feature many of the substantive character-
istics and tensions of such a legal order.62
III. FIVE MODELS OF RELIGION AND STATE RELATIONS
The separation of church and state was seen by Enlightenment
thinkers as a means of confining dangerous and irrational religious
passions to the private sphere. In the modern West, the longstand-
ing French policy of laFcitg is arguably the clearest manifestation of
the desire to restrict clerical and religious influence over the state.64
By enacting its 2004 ban of Muslim headscarves in public schools,
the French Parliament illustrated France's "suspicion of religion
and its attempt to avert the growth and influence of an incipient
Muslim fundamentalism in that nation."65 But although the strict
center.
62. In addition, hundreds of millions live in countries with a designated state religion. A
further two billion people live in countries such as India, Indonesia, Turkey, or Ireland where
no particular religion is granted formal status, but where religious affiliation is a pillar of
collective identity. The de facto, as opposed to de jure, boundaries of religion and state in
these countries are blurred at best, and are continually contested in both the political and the
judicial sphere.
63. See Madhavi Sunder, Piercing the Veil, 112 YALE L.J. 1399, 1402 (2003).
64. See REX AHDAR & IAN LEIGH, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN THE LIBERAL STATE 73 (2005).
65. Id.; see also Ayelet Shachar, Religion, State, and the Problem of Gender: New Modes
1190 [Vol. 49:1179
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separation approach is the one most familiar to scholars of constitu-
tional law and politics in the United States, expanding our horizons
comparatively reveals at least five other constitutional-institutional
models for delineating the relationship between religion and state;
these models are of crucial importance for our analysis of the
phenomenon of constitutional theocracy. I briefly discuss each in
turn.
The first model involves states that have separated religion from
state in what may be called separationist reformism. The Mustafa
Kemal Ataturk-led secularization of predominantly religious Turkey
is perhaps the most well-known example of separationist reformism
in the twentieth century. Following the demise of the Ottoman
Empire, the Kemalist secular-nationalist elite decided to abandon
Islamic culture and laws, in favor of secularism and modernism.
66
Accordingly, both the 1961 and the 1982 constitutions established
an official state policy of laicism.67
In Thailand, the immensely popular Theravada Buddhism has
had to make way for a civic ideology centering on the Thai monarchy
and advanced by a tripartite coalition of the military, state bureau-
cracy, and business elites, which has dominated Thai politics since
the early twentieth century.6" Similar in its effects was the Soviet
regime's policy that forced Armenia to abandon its formal ties with
the Armenian Apostolic Church, which had been recognized as
Armenia's state religion from the fourth century until the early
twentieth century. 6 In Ethiopia, the introduction of strict anti-
religious laws followed a military junta's ferocious overthrow of
Emperor Haile Selassie,7 ° descendant of King Solomon and Queen
Sheba, who was a sacred figure for the Rastafarian movement in
Jamaica.71 Selassie was also, and most importantly, negotiator of
of Citizenship and Governance in Diverse Societies, 50 McGILL L.J. 49, 59-61 (2005).
66. See 2 POLITICS AND RELIGION, supra note 1, at 895.
67. See 1982 TORKIYE CUMHURIYETI ANAYASASI [TURK. CONST.] art. 2; 1961 TORKIYE
CUMHURIYETI ANAYASASI [TURK. CONST.] art. 2.
68. See TAMARA LoOS, SUBJECT SIAM: FAMILY, LAW, AND COLONIAL MODERNITY IN
THAILAND 22-24 (2006).
69. Paul Froese, After Atheism: An Analysis of Religious Monopolies in the Post-
Communist World, 65 Soc. RELIGION 57, 58 (2004).
70. See BAHRU ZEWDE, A HISTORY OF MODERN ETHIOPIA 1855-1991, at 236-48 (2d ed.
2001).
71. See id. at 1.
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autocephaly and a longtime patron of the Ethiopian Orthodox
Church. v2 In a notably more civilized fashion, Portugal (1976),7
Spain (1978),74 and Italy (1984) 7' all adopted new constitutions or
constitutional amendments that disestablished Catholicism as their
state religion.
In contrast to the disaggregation of state and religion, a second
pertinent constitutional model is a weak form of religious establish-
ment-for example, establishment through the formal, mainly
ceremonial, designation of a certain religion as "state religion. 76
Several European countries illustrate this model. An evident case
in point is the designation of the Evangelical Lutheran Church as
a "state church" in Norway, Denmark, Finland, and Iceland-
arguably some of Europe's most liberal and progressive polities. 7
Norway's head of state, for example, is also the leader of the state
church.78 Article 2 of the Norwegian Constitution guarantees
freedom of religion, but also states that Evangelical Lutheranism is
the official state religion. 7' Article 12 requires more than half of the
members of the Norwegian Council of State to be members of the
state church.' Similarly, Greece and Cyprus formally designate the
Greek Orthodox Church as the state church."' In England, the
monarch is "Supreme Governor" of the Church of England and
72. LEONARD E. BARRETT, SR., THE RASTAFARIANS 206-09 (1988) (discussing Selassie's
relationship with the Ethiopian Orthodox Church).
73. See 1 PoLiTics AND RELIGION, supra note 6, at 287.
74. See 2 POLITICS AND RELIGION, supra note 1, at 847.
75. See Agreement To Amend the 1929 Lateran Concordat, Italy-Vatican, Feb. 18, 1984,
24 I.L.M. 1589, 1591 (1985).
76. A diluted version of this model is at work in Germany, where the institutional
apparati of the Evangelical, Catholic, and Jewish religious communities are designated as
public corporations and therefore qualify for state support pursuant to the German church
tax. 1 POLITIcS AND RELIGION, supra note 6, at 343.
77. U.S. Dep't of State, Background Note: Norway (Oct. 2007), http://www.state.gov/r/
psei/bgn/3421.htm; U.S. Dep't of State, Background Note: Denmark (Oct. 2007), http://www.
state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3167.htm; U.S. Dep't of State, Background Note: Finland (Oct. 2007),
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn3238.htm; U.S. Dep't of State, Background Note: Iceland
(Jan. 2008), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3396.htm.
78. NORGES RIGES GRUNDLOV [CONST. OF THE KINGDOM OF NOR.] art. 2.
79. Id.
80. Id. at art. 12.
81. U.S. Dep't of State, Background Note: Greece (Nov. 2007), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/
ei/bgn/3395.htm; U.S. Dep't of State, Background Note: Cyprus (Jan. 2008), http://www.
state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5376.htm.
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'Defender of the Faith."82 The Crown has a role in senior ecclesiasti-
cal matters and, by the same token, the church is involved in the
coronation of a new monarch, and senior bishops are represented in
the House of Lords.83
A third response to the tension between secularism and religiosity
is the selective accommodation of religion in certain areas of the law.
Here, the general law is secular, yet a degree of jurisdictional
autonomy is granted to religious minorities, primarily in matters of
personal status and education. Countries such as Israel, Kenya,
India, and South Africa grant recognized religious and customary
communities the jurisdictional autonomy to pursue their own
traditions in several areas of law, most notably family law. For
example, each religious community in Israel has autonomous
religious courts that hold jurisdiction over its respective members'
marriage and divorce affairs.' Kenya has enacted a set of statutes
to recognize the diversity of personal laws pertaining to different
groups of citizens.8 8 India has long been entangled in a bitter debate
concerning the scope and status of Muslim and Hindu religious
personal laws, versus the individual rights and liberties protected
by the Indian Constitution.
An increasingly prevalent yet seldom discussed fourth model is
essentially a mirror image of these "religious jurisdictional
enclaves"-what we might call secular jurisdictional enclaves. Here,
most of the law is religious; however, certain areas of the law, such
as economic law, are "carved out" and insulated from influence by
religious law. Virtually all Islamic countries maintain criminal and
economic codes that are based on French civil law, British common
law, or other sources of law introduced by, or otherwise borrowed
82. See The Monarchy Today, Queen and Church, http://www.royalinsight.gov.ukloutput/
Page4708.asp (last visited Feb. 20, 2008).
83. See id.
84. See ESTHER M. SNYDER, ISRAEL: A LEGAL RESEARCH GUIDE 23 (2000).
85. For an overview, see Joel A. Nichols, Multi-Tiered Marriage: Ideas and Influences from
New York and Louisiana to the International Community, 40 VAND. J. TRANSNATLL. 135, 179-
84 (2007).
86. See VRINDA NARIAN, GENDER AND COMMUNITY: MUSLIM WOMEN'S RIGHTS IN INDIA 36-
37 (2001); AYELET SHAHCAR, MULTICULTURAL JURISDICTIONS: CULTURAL DIFFERENCES AND
WOMEN'S RIGHTS 78-85 (2001).
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from, European nations, alongside a variable status for fiqh (Islamic
law and jurisprudence)."7
An interesting case in point here is Saudi Arabia, arguably the
country whose legal system comes the closest to being fully based on
fiqh.88 Shari'a law is bad for business, however. Whereas Saudi
courts apply Shari'a in all matters of civil, criminal, or personal
status, Article 232 of a 1965 Royal Decree provides for the establish-
ment of a commission for the settlement of all commercial
disputes.8 9 Although judges of the ordinary courts are usually
appointed by the Ministry of Justice from among graduates of
recognized Shari'a law colleges, members of the commission for the
settlement of disputes are appointed by the Ministry of Trade. 90 In
other words, Saudi Arabia has effectively exempted the entire
finance, banking, and corporate capital sectors from application of
Shari'a rules. Foreign investors have not protested the move.
Following the same rationale, Saudi Arabia has recently em-
barked upon a comprehensive modernization of its judicial system.91
Among the overhaul's main tenets is the creation of specialized
courts in criminal, commercial, labor, and family issues instead
of a general judge-made Shari'a-based interpretation in these
matters.92 Additionally, "[t]he judiciary council that used to act as
the highest court and was controlled by some of the most reaction-
ary clerics in the kingdom, has been relegated to administration."93
A new ten-member Supreme Court will be filled mostly with royal
appointees, not merely with religious clerics, thereby allowing the
kingdom to extend its pragmatic, flexible application of Shari'a to
various aspects of public life. 4
87. See Stephen Schwartz, Shari'a in Saudia Arabia, Today and Tomorrow, in RADICAL
ISLAM'S RULES: THE WORLDWIDE SPREAD OF EXTREME SHARI'A LAW 20 (Paul Marshall ed.,
2005) [hereinafter RADICAL ISLAM'S RULES].
88. See generally id.
89. Legal System of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, http://www.gulf-law.comlsaudi_
judicial.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2008).
90. Id.
91. See, e.g., Law of God Versus Law of Man, ECONOMIST, Oct. 13, 2007, at 50, 50-51.
92. Id. at 51.
93. Id.
94. Id.
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Another example is the city of Dubai, which was recently ranked
the United Arab Emirates's number one tourist destination.95 A
suite in the Burj Al Arab, one of the world's finest hotels, costs up
to $11,000 per night.96 Upon its completion, Burj Dubai is soon to
become the tallest free-standing structure in the world.97 Dubailand,
twice as big as Disney World, is the world's largest amusement
park.98 The United Arab Emirates, of which Dubai is a part, has the
seventh highest GDP per capita of any country in the world.99 As in
Saudi Arabia, although the Shari'a is the main source of law,
economic law is civil and is therefore not subject to religious
injunctions.' °
In a similar vein, Islam has been the state religion in the
Maldives since the twelfth century.1 1 Adherence to Islam is
required for citizenship." 2 Furthermore, there is no secular legal
system; rather, the local version of Shari'a law, as it is interpreted
by state authorities and the Majlis, is the law of the land.'0 3 Yet the
Maldives continue to boast some of the world's finest hotels,
catering to jet-set tourists attracted to the Maldives's world class
coral reefs. A special presidential decree exempts the thriving
tourist industry, which accounts for over 20 percent of the country's
GDP, from several non-tourist-friendly religious imperatives.
10 4
Another approach to balancing the tensions inherent in constitu-
tional theocracy is a mixed system of religious law and general legal
principles. It is well known that Afghanistan has long been torn
95. German Business Council, The United Arab Emirates at a Glance, http://www.gbc-
dubai.com/info.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2008).
96. Denny Lee, The Latest Splash? Baths and Pools, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 2006, at TR9.
97. Leslie Wayne, A Flight Plan for the Long Haul, N.Y. TMES, July 6, 2007, at C1 (noting
that the building will stand 810 meters tall).
98. Lorne Mauly, SPORTS ABROAD; Not a Mirage, but Certainly a Sight, N.Y. TIMES,
May 9, 2006, at D1.
99. CIA World Factbook, Rank Order, GDP-per capita, https://www.cia.gov/library/
publications/the-world-factbooklrankorder/2004rank.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2008).
100. CIA World Factbook, United Arab Emirates, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/
the-world-factbooklgeos/ae.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2008).
101. U.S. Dep't of State, Background Note: Maldives (Jan. 2008), http://www.state.
gov/r/pa/ei/bgnI5476.htm.
102. U.S. Dep't of State, Maldives, International Religious Freedom Report 2004, http:/I
www.state.gov/g/drl]rls/irf2004/35517.htm.
103. Id.
104. Id.
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between conflicting values of tradition and modernism. 108 From 1994
to 2001, the country was ruled by the radical Islamist Taliban,' ° but
the U.S.-led military campaign removed the Taliban from power
and installed a more moderate regime representing an array of
groups hitherto in opposition: moderate religious leaders and the
country's elites and intellectuals in exile. °7 The new constitution of
Afghanistan came into effect in January 2004,08 and it states that
Afghanistan is an Islamic Republic; °9 that the "sacred religion of
Islam is the religion of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan;""10 and
that "[n]o law shall contravene the tenets and provisions of the holy
religion of Islam in Afghanistan.""' Courts are allowed to use
Hanafi jurisprudence-one of Sunni Islam's more liberal interpre-
tive schools-in situations of constitutional lacunae. 112 At the same
time, the constitution also enshrines the right to private property
11
and resurrects a woman's right to vote," 4 as well as to run for and
serve in office." 5 The 2004 constitution also establishes a Supreme
Court composed of nine judges appointed by the president for a term
105. See generally Hannibal Travis, Freedom or Theocracy?: Constitutionalism in
Afghanistan and Iraq, 3 Nw. J. INT'L HUM. RTs. 4 (2005) (recounting the clashes between
Afghanistan's political modernizers and traditionalists from the 1920s through the most
recent constitution drafting in 2003).
106. Elizabeth Rubin, In the Land of the Taliban, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Oct. 22, 2006, at 88-89.
107. See, e.g., Barry Bearak, A City of Exiles Dreams of Power Regained, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
11, 2001, at Al (describing the convergence in Peshawar of "exiled commanders, politicians,
[and] mullahs" competing for a place in the post-Taliban government); Dan Fesperman,
Karzai Survives To Lead Afghans; Tribal Chief Dodges U.S. Bomb, Taliban To Head
Government, BALT. SUN, Dec. 6, 2001, at Al (profiling Western-oriented "opposition leader in
exile" Hamid Karzai, Afghanistan's first post-Taliban president); Main Players in the Future
Administration of Afghanistan, INDEPENDENT (London), Dec. 4,2001, at 6 (cataloguing six key
figures in the post-Taliban Afghan government).
108. Carlotta Gall, Afghan Council Gives Approval to Constitution, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5,
2004, at Al.
109. AFG. CONST. ch. I, art. 1, available at http://www.afghan-web.com/politics/current
_constitution.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2008).
110. Id. ch. I, art. 2.
111. Id. ch. I, art. 3.
112. Id. ch. VII, art. 130.
113. Id. ch. II, art. 40.
114. See id. ch. II, art. 22.
115. See id.
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of ten years."' All members of the Court "[s]hall have higher
education in legal studies or Islamic jurisprudence.""' 7
A second example of a mixed system is the legal system of the
Comoros, which rests on two tenets: Islamic law and an inherited
Napoleonic French legal code."' Islam has increasingly dominated
the political sphere and the May 2006 elections were won by Ahmed
Abdallah Mohamed Sambi, a Sunni Muslim cleric nicknamed the
"Ayatollah" for his time spent studying Islam in Iran."9 But the
French civil code prevails in most areas of commercial life.'20 The
Constitutional Court, the ultimate arbiter of constitutional ques-
tions,12 consists of seven judges who are all well-versed in both the
French civil law tradition and the Shafi'i school,'22 which stresses
reasoning by analogy. 2 '
Akin to the constitutions of over two dozen predominantly Muslim
polities, Article 2 of Yemen's constitution, adopted in 1994, declares
that Islam is the religion of the state. 2 4 Article 3 further provides
116. Id. ch. VII, arts. 116-17. The Afghan Supreme Court is called the Stera Mahkama.
117. Id. ch. VII, art. 118.
118. Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Dep't of State, Country Reports
on Human Rights Practices, 2006 (Mar. 6, 2007), http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/
2006/78727.htm.
119. See World Briefing: Africa. Comoros: Muslim Cleric Wins Presidential Election, N.Y.
TIMES, May 16, 2007, at A8.
120. Comoros is a signatory to the Treaty on the Harmonization of Business Law in Africa,
which binds signatories to apply a civil code framework in areas of business law. See Traile
Relatif a l'Harmonisation en Afrique du Droit des Affaires, 4 Journal Officiel [JO] OHADA
1 (Nov. 1, 1997), available at http://www.ohada.com/traite.php?categorie=10; Salvatore
Mancuso, Trends on the Harmonization of Contract Law in Africa, 13 ANN. SURV. INT'L &
COMP. L. 157, 165-66 (2007). Additionally, Comoros law provides that in terms of national
monetary policy, its national civil law trumps locally administered Islamic law. See INT'L
MONETARY FUND, COUNTRY REP. No. 04/233, UNION OF THE COMOROS: SELECTED ISSUES AND
STATISTICAL APPENDIX 22 (2004), http://www.imf.orglexternal]pubs/ft/scr/2004/cr04233.pdf;
see also COMOROS CONST. art. 3 (providing that international treaties take precedence over
local island law).
121. See COMOROS CONST. art. 31.
122. See id. arts. 32-33. The constitution requires that Constitutional Court members "have
high moral standards and great integrity as well as a recognised competence in the legal,
administrative, economic or social domains." Id. art. 33, translation available at
http://www.parliament.go.th/parcy/sapa-db/cons_doc/constitutions/data/Comoros/Comoros.doc
(last visited Feb. 21, 2008).
123. See MARTIN SHAPIRO, COURTS: A COMPARATIVE AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS 198 (1981).
Shafi'i is another of the four Sunni schools of law. Id.
124. YEMEN CONST. pt. I, ch. I, art. 2 (1994), available at http://www.al-bab.comlyemen
gov/con94.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2008).
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that Shari'a is the source of all legislation."' Non-Muslims are
forbidden from running for or holding elected office.' 26 The same
constitution, however, calls for an independent judiciary,"7 and
establishes a separate commercial court system 128 and a Supreme
Court,121 which draws upon a combination of Shari'a interpretations
and principles of modern constitutional law. 0 Consequently, unique
constitutional amalgamations of religious and modern principles
emerge, such as Article 31 of the constitution, stating: 'Women are
the sisters of men. They have rights and duties, which are guaran-
teed and assigned by Shari'ah and stipulated by law."'' Another
amalgam occurs in Article 46, according to which, "Criminal liability
is personal. No crime or punishment shall be undertaken without a
provision in the Shari'ah or the law."'32
The Islamic Republic of Iran is commonly considered to be a
fundamentalist theocracy, with governing principles and practices
that bear very little resemblance to prevailing principles of western
constitutionalism. In practice, however, its system of government
features many elements of a constitutional democracy. 3 The
preamble of the 1979 Islamic Republic Constitution enshrines the
Shari'a as the supreme law-superior even to the Constitution
itself. 34 Articles 2 and 3 declare that authority for sovereignty and
legislation has a divine provenance (from the Shari'a) and that the
leadership of the clergy is a principle of faith.135 According to Article
125. Id. pt. I, ch. I, art. 3.
126. Id. pt. III, ch. II, art. 106.
127. Id. pt. III, ch. III, art. 147.
128. See U.S. Dep't of State, Background Note: Yemen (Dec. 2007), http://www.state.gov/r/
pa/eilbgn/35836.htm.
129. YEMEN CONST. pt. III, ch. III, art. 151 (1994), available at http://www.al-bab.com/
yemen/gov/con94.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2008).
130. See U.S. INST. OF PEACE, STATE AND NON-STATE JUSTICE IN YEMEN 2 (2006),
http://www.usip.org/ruleoflaw/projects/zwaini-paper.pdf (describing Yemen's mix of Shari'a,
tribal, constitutional, and international law, which comprises the state law to be applied by
its courts).
131. YEMEN CONST. pt. I, ch. III, art. 31 (emphasis added).
132. Id. pt. II, art. 46 (emphasis added).
133. See generally ASGHAR SCHIRAZI, THE CONSTITUTION OF IRAN: POLITICS AND THE STATE
IN THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC (1997); Mehran Tamadonfar, Islam, Law, and Political Control in
Contemporary Iran, 20 J. SCI. STUD. RELIGION 205 (2001).
134. See QANUNI ASSASSI JUMHURI'I ISLA'MAI IRAN [The Constitution of the Islamic
Republic of Iran] pmbl. [1980].
135. Id. arts. 2-3.
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6, the administration of the state is to be conducted by the wider
population: the general public participates in the election of the
President, the Majlis representatives (members of parliament),
and municipality councils."3 6 Article 8 further entrenches princi-
ples of popular participation in deciding political, economic, and
social issues.'37 Most notably, Iran has seen the emergence of the
Guardian Council-a de facto constitutional court armed with
mandatory constitutional preview powers and composed of six
mullahs appointed by the Supreme Leader and six jurists proposed
by the head of the judicial system of Iran and voted in by the
Majlis. 38 The Supreme Leader has the power to dismiss the
religious members of the Guardian Council, but not its jurist
members.'39 More stunning still is Khomeini's strategic initiative
in 1988 to amend the Iranian Constitution in order to institutional-
ize the regime's Discernment Expediency Council (majma-e
tashkhis maslahat nezam) to serve as the final arbiter between the
Consultative Assembly (Majlis) and the Guardian Council (shoray-e
negahban).4 ° This new body-as of October 2005 the ultimate
judicial body in Iran''-aids the government in asserting its
pragmatist approach to public policymaking (based on the concept
of "national necessity") over the Guardian Council's more doctrinal,
rigid interpretive approach to pertinent religious directives.'42 In
summary, even in the least likely settings, constitutional framers
have been able to hedge or mitigate the tension between modern day
needs and principles of theocratic governance through innovative
constitutional design and reconstruction.
136. Id. art. 6.
137. See id. art. 8.
138. CIA World Factbook, Iran, https://www.cia.gov/library/pubications/the-world-factbookl
geos/ir.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2008).
139. QANUNI ASSASSI JUMHURI'I ISLA'MAI IRAN [The Constitution of the Islamic Republic
of Iran] art. 91 [1980].
140. See U.S. Dep't of State, Background Note: Iran (June 2007), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/
ei/bgnI5314.htm.
141. See id.
142. See Ray Takeyh & Nikolas K. Gvosdev, Pragmatism in the Midst of Iranian Turmoil,
WASH. Q., Autumn 2004, at 33, 38-39.
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IV. CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS AS SECULARIZING AGENTS
The growing popular support for principles of theocratic gover-
nance poses a major threat to the cultural propensities and policy
preferences of secular, cosmopolitan, moderate elites in these
countries. A common strategy for addressing some of the difficulties
presented in the ongoing friction between traditional religious
outlooks and principles of modern constitutionalism is the construc-
tion of constitutional courts armed with judicial review powers.143
This strategy has little effect in failed state settings, but in other
pertinent settings, it may have some bite.
It is well-established in the literature that constitutionalization
and the establishment of judicial review may increase the interna-
tional reputation and credibility of regimes.'44 But this is only part
of the picture. In countries struggling with the complex issue of
constitutional theocracy, constitutional courts may also be viewed
as the guardians of secularism, modernism, and universalism
against the increasing popularity of theocratic principles. In order
to govern effectively, politicians and ruling elites in predominantly
religious polities must confront the challenge of constitutional
theocracy while simultaneously maintaining popular support for
their regimes. Indeed, an increasingly common strategy by those
who wield political power-and represent the groups and policy
preferences that object to principles of theocratic governance-is
the transfer of fundamental collective identity questions of "religion
and state" from the political sphere to the courts. Consequently,
constitutional courts have been assigned the sensitive task of
dealing with contentious political "hot potatoes." The result has
been an unprecedented judicialization of foundational collective
143. See supra Part III.
144. See, e.g., Tamir Moustafa, Law Versus the State: The Judicialization of Politics in
Egypt, 28 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 883 (2003); Douglass C. North & Barry Weingast, Constitutions
and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-
Century England, 49 J. ECON. HIST. 803 (1989); Barry Weingast, Constitutions as Governance
Structures: The Political Foundations of Secure Markets, 149 J. INST. & THEORETICAL ECON.
286 (1993). For the importance of judicial review mechanisms generally, see William W. Van
Alstyne, Quintessential Elements of Meaningful Constitutions in Post-Conflict States, 49 WM.
& MARY L. REv. 1497 (2008). But see Mark Tushnet, Some Skepticism About Normative
Constitutional Advice, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1473 (2008).
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identity, particularly issues relating to religion and state, and the
subsequent emergence of constitutional courts as important
secularizing agents in these countries.
Why is it that constitutional courts are so appealing to secularist,
modernist, cosmopolitan, and other antireligious social forces in
polities facing deep divisions along secular/religious lines? First,
there is a "blame deflection" logic at work. From the politicians'
points of view, delegating contentious political questions to the
courts may be an effective means of shifting responsibility, and
thereby reducing the risks to themselves and to the institutional
apparatus within which they operate. The calculus of this "blame
deflection" strategy is highly intuitive. If a delegation of power to
the courts will increase the credit and/or reduce the blame attrib-
uted to the politician as a result of the policy decision of a delegated
body, then a delegation of this sort can benefit the politician.14 At
the very least, the transfer of contested political issues to the courts
offers a convenient retreat for politicians who have been unwilling
or unable to settle contentious public disputes in the political
sphere. 4 ' It may also offer refuge for politicians seeking to avoid
difficult or "no win" decisions and/or avoid the collapse of deadlocked
or fragile governing coalitions.'47 In other words, transferring these
contested issues to the courts allows secularist leaders to talk the
talk of commitment to religious values without walking the actual
walk of that commitment.
Second, the constitutionalization of religion subjects certain
aspects of religious affairs to state monitoring. With state funding
comes statutory regulation. Akin to the legalization of otherwise
unregulated and unauthorized norms and practices, the consti-
tutionalization of religion may help prevent the evolution of an
"underworld" of religious authority and institutions. The "legaliza-
tion" point has another related aspect to it. Historically, religious
law operated primarily as private law. Its traditional location was
in non-centralized religious institutions in which the judgment of
145. Stefan Voigt & Eli Salzberger, Choosing Not To Choose: When Politicians Choose To
Delegate Powers, 55 KYKLOS 289, 294 (2002).
146. Id. at 294-95.
147. See Mark Graber, The Nonmajoritarian Difficulty: Legislative Deference to the
Judiciary, 7 STUD. AM. POL. DEv. 35, 38-45 (1993) (detailing instances of legislative deferral
to the courts in American political history).
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individual jurists was autonomous and final, and certainly not
subject to appeal. 14 Cases were voluntarily brought to religious
tribunals by private parties, not by a public prosecuting authority,
and there was no state enforcement mechanism.'49 The whole
enterprise was run as an informal, yet socially and morally binding,
arbitration system. For example, as Martin Shapiro has noted,
non-appellate "kadi justice" in Islamic jurisprudence reflects the
absence of central political authority.' ° By contrast, the formal
constitutionalization of religion brings religious law to the fore of
the public law domain, where the state with its central political
authority, regulatory hierarchies, and appellate procedures has
always been a key stakeholder.
Delegation and legitimation, however, are not all that attracts
certain polity members to the lure of the constitutional court.
Rather, the very logic of modern constitutional law-with its state-
driven legitimacy and authority, procedural rules of engagement,
methods and styles of reasoning, and often measured approaches to
politically charged questions-seems intrinsically appealing to a
moderate approach to issues of religion and state. Constitutional
courts' very conception of the rule of (state) law, with its deep-rooted
orientation toward European legal tradition and what Max Weber
characterized as formal and rational reasoning, ' necessarily
weakens the potential accommodation of alternative hierarchies of
traditional or religious interpretation. The emergence of proportion-
ality as the prevalent interpretive method in comparative constitu-
tional jurisprudence also makes constitutional courts appealing
to relatively moderate or secular elites.152 By its very nature,
proportionality favors middle-of-the-road, balanced, judicious and
pragmatic solutions to contested issues. Extreme or radical positions
are not likely to fare well under proportionality.
148. See SHAPIRO, supra note 123, at 204-12 (citing the case of Islamic law).
149. Id.
150. Id. at 195-96.
151. See MAX WEBER ON LAW IN ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 65-97 (Max Rheinstein ed., 1st ed.
1954).
152. On proportionality as the new Esperanto or lingua franca of comparative
constitutional jurisprudence, see, e.g., DAVID BEATTY, THE ULTIMATE RULE OF LAW 159-88
(2004).
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A constitutional court's reluctance to grant support to radical
religious views may also derive from its interest in retaining its
status as the one and only legitimate interpreter of laws vis-A-vis
the perceived menace of alternative interpretation systems-
namely, traditional religious authorities, which are well-established
within the circles of the traditional supporters of theocratic
governance and have been steadily gaining support among new
crowds. The deep structural reluctance of constitutional courts to
recognize the legitimacy of alternative, primarily religious, interpre-
tation systems is one of the main reasons for their near universal
appeal to the urban intelligentsia, the "managerial class," and
proponents of civic nationalism."3
There are also more prosaic reasons why proponents of threat-
ened secularist worldviews and policy preferences may turn to the
courts. Most constitutional court judges have had a general legal
education and are familiar with Western law's basic principles
and methods of reasoning.' More often than not, the judge's
educational background, cultural propensities, and social milieu
are closer to those of the urban intelligentsia and top state bureau-
crats than to any other social group. Constitutional courts are
established and funded by the state and their judges are appointed
by state authorities, often with the approval of political leaders.
Consequently, the judge's record of adjudication is well known at
the time of his or her appointment. And, as the recent history of
comparative constitutional politics shows us, the recurrence of
unsolicited judicial intervention in the political sphere in gen-
eral-and unwelcome judgments concerning contentious political
issues in particular-have brought about significant political
backlashes, targeted at clipping the wings of over-active courts.1
5 5
Among the more common power-constraining strategies are the
153. See RAN HIRSCHL, TOWARDS JURISTOCRACY 38-49 (2004) (describing the reasons for
which political and economic elites often support the constitutionalization of society in order
to check democratic preferences).
154. See, e.g., AiMAL MIAN, A JUDGE SPEAKS OUT (2004); Clark B. Lombardi & Nathan J.
Brown, Do Constitutions Requiring Adherence to Shari'a Threaten Human Rights?: How
Egypt's Constitutional Court Reconciles Islamic Law with the Liberal Rule of Law, 21 AM. U.
INT'L L. REV. 379, 430-34 (2006) (discussing the contrasting interpretive theories of jurists
trained in secular law and the educational focus on respecting precedent).
155. See Frank B. Cross, Thoughts on Goldilocks and Judicial Independence, 64 OHIO ST.
L.J. 195, 199-202 (2003) (discussing the Iranian experience).
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following: executive overrides of controversial rulings; political
tinkering with judicial appointment and tenure procedures to
ensure the appointment of compliant judges and/or to block the
appointment of undesirable judges; court-packing attempts by those
who hold political power; disciplinary sanctions; impeachment or
removal of objectionable or over-active judges; the introduction of
jurisdictional constraints; or clipping jurisdictional boundaries and
powers of judicial review. 5 All of these factors make it unlikely that
constitutional court judges in a given polity can continue to hold
views that are consistently at odds with the views of the secular-
nationalist political elites.
And when judges do not comply, the political reaction may be
fierce. In late 1997, for example, a serious rift developed between
Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court, Sajjad Ali Shah, over the appointment of new
judges to the court. 5 7 The constitutional crisis came to a dramatic
end when the chief justice was suspended from office by rebel
members of the Supreme Court.5 8 A crisis of a similar nature
occurred in January 2000, when Pervez Musharraf insisted that all
members of the Supreme Court pledge allegiance to the military
administration.'59 The judges who refused to take the oath were
expelled from the Court.'" In a similar fashion, in March 2007,
Musharraf ordered Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry to resign,
presumably for being over-independent and therefore "unreliable"
from the government's point of view. 1' Protests by Pakistani
156. See, e.g., id. at 205-08 (discussing U.S. methods of restraining the judiciary). For a
general survey of the various formal and informal political checks on the judiciary in the
United States, see TERRI JENNINGS PEREUTr, IN DEFENSE OF APOLITICAL COURT (1999), as well
as GERALD ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 9-36
(1991). See also Gerald Rosenberg, Judicial Independence and the Reality of Political Power,
54 REV. POL. 369 (1992). For a discussion and worldwide examples of "judicialized mega-
politics," see Ran Hirschl, The New Constitutionalism and the Judicialization of Pure Politics
Worldwide, 75 FORDHAM L. REv. 721, 743-51 (2006).
157. See Hirschl, supra note 156, at 749.
158. Pakistan's Top Court Gets New Leader;After Political, Judicial Battles Comes Healing,
TORONTO STAR, Dec. 4, 1997, at A23.
159. See Pamela Constable, Pakistani Ruler's Reform Agenda Mired in Politics, WASH.
POST, Feb. 10, 2000, at A17.
160. Id.
161. See Griff Witte, Ousted Chief Justice Speaks Out in Pakistan; Protesting Lawyers Hail
Judge as Hero, Call on President Musharraf To Resign, WASH. POST, Mar. 28, 2007, at A12.
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lawyers and opposition groups led to fierce clashes with police.'62
Ultimately, Chaudhry was reinstated by the Pakistani Supreme
Court in July 2007,163 a ruling Musharraf had to accept as his bid for
continuing grasp on power now depended upon the support of
secularist Benazir Bhutto, whose followers instigated the pro-
Chaudhry demonstrations. 64 However, as is well known, in
November 2007 Musharraf declared a state of emergency in
Pakistan, suspended the constitution, dismissed Chief Justice
Chaudhry for the second time in eight months, and appointed
several loyalist judges to the Pakistan Supreme Court. 6 ' The entire
maneuver was driven, in no small part, by Musharraf s concern that
the Court might declare Musharraf ineligible to serve as President
of Pakistan as long as he continues to head the Pakistani armed
forces. 166
Following two and a half years of conservative jurisprudence in
religious matters by the newly established Afghan Supreme Court,
President Hamid Karzai opted for a shake-up of the Court's
composition. In 2006, he appointed several new, more moderate
members to the Court."6 7 In addition, the reappointment of the
conservative Chief Justice Faisal Ahmad Shinwari-a conservative
Islamic cleric with questionable educational credentials-did not
pass parliamentary vote. 8' Karzai then chose his legal counsel,
Abdul Salam Azimi-a former university professor who was educated
in the United States-to succeed Shinwari.'6 9 The new, distinctly
more moderate Court was sworn in August 2006.
Consider also Egypt, with its history of political interference with
the judicial sphere. The most blatant example is the 1969 "massacre
162. Id.
163. Shahan Mufti, Is Democracy "Reborn"in Pakistan?, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, July 23,
2007, at 6.
164. See Declan Walsh, Bhutto Ready To Share Power if Musharraf Drops Military Role,
GUARDIAN (London), July 30, 2007, at 15.
165. See Shahan Mufti & Mark Sappenfield, Emergency Rule in Pakistan: Musharrafs Last
Grab for Power?, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Nov. 5, 2007, at 1.
166. See id.
167. Pamela Constable, Afghans' Uneasy Peace With Democracy; In Discord Over Convert's
Trial, Muslims Say They Identify with Islamic Law First, WASH. POST., Apr. 22, 2006, at A15.
168. See Carlotta Gall, Parliament in Kabul Rejects Pick for Top Court, N.Y. TIMES, May
28, 2006, at A14.
169. See KENNETH KATZMAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., AFGHANISTAN: GOVERNMENT
FORMATION AND PERFORMANCE 6 (2007), http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS21922.pdf.
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of the judiciary," where more than 200 senior judicial personnel
were dismissed by a presidential decree for being overly independ-
ent. 170 Along the same lines, disciplinary hearings were held against
Egypt's Supreme Constitutional Court Judges Hisham al-Bastawisi
and Mahmoud Makki for openly accusing the government of
electoral fraud in the November 2005 elections.17' In March 2007,
President Hosni Mubarak introduced a set of constitutional
amendments that effectively gave more power to the president,
banned the establishment of religious parties (a blatant anti-
Muslim Brotherhood move), and loosened controls on security forces
in its "war on terror. ' 172 Among the reforms introduced was the
removal of judicial scrutiny of electoral lists, ballots, and proce-
dures. 17
3
A careful examination of the constitutional jurisprudence of apex
courts in Egypt, Israel, Malaysia, Nigeria, Pakistan, and Turkey-
six polities that have been facing the challenge of constitutional
theocracy for decades--demonstrates how courts have become key
secularizing agents for elites despite intense scrutiny from the more
religious segments of the public. 174 Moreover, each example country
illustrates the remarkably creative interpretive techniques adopted
by judges confronted with concrete legal disputes that reflect and
encapsulate the greater issues emerging from constitutional
theocracy.
Egypt, Israel, Malaysia, Nigeria, Pakistan, and Turkey have all
experienced a growth in the influence of religious political move-
ments, with a commensurate increase in the levels of popular
support that they receive. At the same time, these countries differ
170. See Mahmoud M. Hamad, The Politics of Judicial Selection in Egypt, in APPOINTING
JUDGES IN AN AGE OF JUDICIAL POWER 260, 266-67 (Kate Malleson & Peter H. Russell eds.,
2006).
171. See Egypt: Investigate Election Fraud, Not Judges, HUM. RTS. WATCH, Apr. 24, 2006,
http://hrw.orglenglish/docs/2006/04/25/egypt13269.htm.
172. See Liz Sly, Egypt's Democrats Feeling Betrayed, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 28, 2007, at CIO.
173. NATHAN J. BROWN, MICHELE DUNNE & AMR HAMZAWY, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR
INT'L PEACE, EGYP'S CONTROVERSIAL CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS: A TEXTUAL ANALYSIS
2-3 (2007), http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/egypLconstitution webcommentary0l.
pdf.
174. A detailed analysis of pertinent jurisprudence will appear in RAN HIRSCHL, SACRED
JUDGMENTS: THE DILEMMA OF CONSTITUTIONAL THEOCRACY (forthcoming 2009). I begin this
analysis in Hirschl, supra note 58.
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in their formal recognition of, and commitment to, religious values.
In Pakistan, the law underwent full Islamization in 1973 and again
in 1985.175 Article 227(1) of the Constitution of Pakistan stipulates
that "[a]ll existing laws shall be brought in conformity with the
Injunctions of Islam as laid down in the Holy Quran and Sunnah,
in this Part referred to as the Injunctions of Islam, and no law shall
be enacted which is repugnant to such Injunctions.' ' 6 In theory,
this means that legislation must be in full compliance with princi-
ples of the Shari'a. Similarly, Article 2 of the Egyptian Constitution,
as amended in 1980, states that principles of Muslim jurisprudence
(the Shari'a) are the primary source of legislation in Egypt,117 while
Israel defines itself as a "Jewish and democratic state.' 78 Malaysia
is a federal country that endorses Islam as its official religion, and
political Islam has been continuously gaining political support and
clout at the state level. 179 Nigeria is a secular federal country that
grants some legislative autonomy to its states, thereby allowing the
states to adopt religiously-influenced laws.8 ° Finally, modern
Turkey characterizes itself as secular, adhering to the Western
model of strict separation of state and religion.'8 ' Accordingly, there
are considerable differences in the interpretive approaches and
practical solutions adopted by the six countries' respective high
courts in dealing with the core questions of religion and state.
Despite these dissimilarities, however, there are some striking
parallels in the way that the constitutional courts in these, and
some other similarly situated countries, have all positioned
themselves as important secularizing forces within their respective
societies.
175. Jeffrey A. Redding, Constitutionalizing Islam: Theory and Pakistan, 44 VA. J. INT'L L.
759, 764-65 (2004).
176. PAK. CONST. pt. IX, § 227(1).
177. EGYPT CONST. pt. 1, art. 2.
178. Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, available at http://www.knesset.gov.il/
laws/specialeng/basic3_eng.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2008) (defining Israel as a "Jewish and
democratic state" in the first Basic Law).
179. See generally Peter G. Riddell, Islamization and Partial Shari'a in Malaysia, in
RADICAL ISLAM's RULES, supra note 87.
180. See Paul Marshall, Nigeria: Shari'a in a Fragmented Country, in RADICAL ISLAM'S
RULES, supra note 87.
181. Hirschl, supra note 58, at 1820 (internal citations omitted).
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Egypt's Supreme Constitutional Court has played a central role
in dealing with the core question of the status of Shari'a rules-
arguably one of the most controversial and fundamental collective
identity issues troubling the Egyptian polity.'82 Constrained by
Article 2 of the Constitution, Egypt's Supreme Constitutional Court
has developed its own moderate interpretation of religious rules and
norms.183 Similarly, the Supreme Court of Pakistan has been able
to advance a holistic view of the constitution that emphasizes the
interdependence and harmony of its various sections. In response to
the possible conclusiveness of § 227(1), the Court developed its
"harmonization doctrine," according to which no specific provision
of the constitution, and that includes § 227(1), stands above any or
all other provisions. The constitution as a whole must be interpreted
in a harmonious fashion so that specific provisions are read as an
integral part of the entire constitution, not as standing above it. In
addition, the Court retained its overarching jurisdictional authority,
including its appellate capacity over the newly established Shariat
Appellate Bench at the Supreme Court."8 This has proved itself
time and again to be a safety net for secular interests vis-4-vis the
formal Islamization of law.
The Israeli Supreme Court responded to the increased tension
between Israel's dual commitment to universal (democratic) and
parochial (Jewish) values by subjecting the jurisprudence of
religious courts to the general principles of administrative and
constitutional law."15 Over the last two decades, the Court pursued
a distinctly liberalizing agenda in core matters of religion and
state.186 At the same time, it has also protected the "Jewishness"
pillar of the state's collective identity against alternative national
narratives, as illustrated in the Court's controversial 2006 ruling in
the Family Unification Case.187
182. Id. at 1832.
183. See, e.g., Lombardi & Brown, supra note 154, at 415-25.
184. See, e.g., Redding, supra note 175, at 770.
185. See Ran Hirschl & Ayelet Shachar, Constitutional Transformation, Gender Equality,
and Religious/National Conflict in Israel, in THE GENDER OF CONSTITUTIONAL
JURISPRUDENCE 205, 205-29 (Beverly Baines & Ruth Rubio-Marin eds., 2005).
186. Hirschl, supra note 58, at 1857.
187. HCJ 7052/03 Adalah v. Minister of Interior [2006] 2 TakEi 1754. Here, in a divided
6-5, 263-page decision, the Court upheld the new Citizenship and Entry into Israel Law,
which imposes age restrictions on both the granting of Israeli citizenship and residency
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In Malaysia and Nigeria, their pertinent differences in formal
accommodation of religion notwithstanding, national high courts
have drawn upon federal/provincial jurisdictional boundaries to
override legislative manifestations of popular religious drift at the
provincial/state level.
188
Finally, the Turkish Constitutional Court (TCC) has played a key
role in preserving the strictly secular nature of Turkey's political
system amid the growing popularity of theocratic governance
principles. 189 This has been done, inter alia, by continually outlaw-
ing anti-secularist political forces and parties. For example, the TCC
dissolved two major Islamic parties, the Welfare (Refah) Party and
the Virtue (Fazilet) Party, in 1998 and 2001, respectively. 90 In May
2007, the TCC went on to annul the parliamentary vote that
designated the pro-Islamic AK Party nominee-foreign affairs
minister Abdullah Gil-as president. 9' A less frequently acknowl-
edged yet equally telling example is the TCC's jurisprudence
restricting the female dress code in the public education system.
A detailed analysis of the comparative "religion and state"
jurisprudence of these six courts illustrates the key role that
constitutional courts play in protecting and preserving the secular
nature of their respective polities against the growing support for
theocratic governance. Although they operate within different
constitutional traditions, frameworks, and constraints, these courts
have been able to advance secular or secularizing responses to
fundamental religion and state questions. In so doing, they have
permits to Arab residents of the Occupied Territories who marry Israeli citizens. See Adalah:
LegalAdvocacy, http://www.adalah.orglengtlegaladvocacypolitical.php#7052 (last visited Feb.
21, 2008). Because the practice of marrying Palestinians is far more common among Israel's
Arab minority, the law effectively targets Arab citizens, but maintains the "demographic
balance" in favor of Israel's Jewish population. The Justices divided between those in the
majority who favored the first tenet in Israel's self-definition as a Jewish and democratic
state, and those in dissent (including then-Chief Justice Aharon Barak) who gave priority to
the second. Id.
188. See generally Paul Marshall, Nigeria: Shari'a in a Fragmented Country, in RADICAL
ISLAM'S RULES, supra note 87, at 113; Andrew Ubaka Iwobi, Tiptoeing Through a
Constitutional Minefield: The Great Sharia Controversy in Nigeria, 48 J. AFR. L. 111 (2004).
189. See Hirschl, supra note 58, at 1851.
190. Id. See generally Dicle Kogacioglu, Progress, Unity, and Democracy: Dissolving
Political Parties in Turkey, 38 LAw &. Soc. REv. 433 (2004).
191. Sabrina Tavernise, Turkish Court Blocks Candidate with Islamic Base, N.Y. TIMES,
May 2, 2007, at Al.
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been able to impose effective limitations on the accommodation of
religious values in public life.19 2
CONCLUSION
This brief Article points to three main lessons. First, the theocra-
tic challenge has become a significant factor in world politics as well
as constitutional law. It stretches well beyond current media hot
spots like Iran, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Any attempt to examine the
complexities of constitution drafting in post-conflict settings without
paying close attention to the ever more relevant secular/universal
versus religious/particularist divide is bound to come up short.
Second, the canonical literature concerning constitutionalism
as an effective means for mitigating tensions in multi-ethnic or
multi-linguistic states does not adequately address the theocratic
challenge. It rests on four main presumptions: territorial concentra-
tion and demarcation; social and demographic cohesiveness among
members of a given group; unified interests, worldviews, and policy
preferences among group members; and an underlying vision of
constitutionalism as a viable forum of compromise. Although these
assumptions provide a plausible set of working hypotheses with
respect to dividing factors such as nationality, ethnicity, or lan-
guage, they are less relevant in capturing the realities of the
secular/religious divide. Of particular significance here are the
inherent tensions between principles of modern constitutionalism
and the rule of law on the one hand and fundamentals of theocratic
governance on the other.
Third, the emergence of a new legal order-constitutional
theocracy, which is now shared in one form or another by dozens of
countries in the developing world-provides important insights into
the sociopolitical role of constitutionalism in predominantly
religious settings. Regimes throughout the new world of constitu-
tional theocracies have been struggling with these foundational
quandaries, forced to navigate between cosmopolitanism and
parochialism, modern and traditional meta-narratives, constitu-
tional principles and religious injunctions, contemporary governance
192. Hirschl, supra note 58, at 1855.
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and ancient texts, judicial and pious interpretation. More often than
not, the clash between these conflicting visions results in fierce
struggles over the nature of the body politic and its organizing
principles.
An uneasy alliance emerges, comprising political leaders, state
bureaucrats, economic stakeholders and the managerial class,
intellectuals, jurists, and the military. Each of these groups
necessarily brings to the table their own worldviews, interests, and
communities of reference. Consequently, they seek to tame the
spread of religious fundamentalism and diffuse attempts to
establish a full-fledged theocracy. Constitutional courts find
themselves at the forefront of this struggle, as they attempt to
address constitutional theocracy and translate its uneasy bundle of
contradictory aims and commitments into practical guidelines for
public life.
The bottom line is this: constitutional theocracies are a
Galapagos-like paradise for scholars of constitutional design in
today's world. They reflect sociopolitical order under constant
duress. Striking tensions are often seen between the rule of law and
the rule of God, cosmopolitanism and parochialism, economic
interests and public will, modern government and religious
authorities, new constitutions and ancient texts, judicial and pious
interpretation. A unique hybrid of seemingly conflicting worldviews,
values, and interests, constitutional theocracies thus offer an ideal
setting-a "living laboratory" as it were-for studying constitutional
law as a form of politics by other means.
